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Is thanatosis caused by fear? 
Thanatosis has been viewed as a 
proxy for ‘fearfulness’ in animals — a 
general proclivity to engage defensive 
or withdrawal behaviours. Not all 
situations that evoke fear responses 
however, will induce thanatosis: 
normally it requires that the animal 
be forcefully held. Thanatosis is an 
unlearned reflex action, and although 
its onset and maintenance can be 
modulated, it is quite different from 
the inactivity produced by the ‘learned 
helplessness’ model of depression 
in animals. Thanatosis can be readily 
induced in decerebrate chickens and 
still be terminated by a normal righting 
reflex. In insects, the brain is required 
for the initiation of thanatosis, but can 
be maintained by the thoracic ganglia. 
The relationship between strength 
of thanatosis and other measures 
of fearfulness seems to depend on 
species. 
Thanatosis is probably a basal and 
evolutionarily conserved defensive 
mechanism of last resort. Of itself, 
it probably only offers the slimmest 
chance of escape from situations 
of near certain death, but in such 
critical circumstances may still 
offer a selective advantage. As 
with all adaptations, thanatosis has 
become the substrate for further 
specializations in some species by 
becoming co-opted into various larger 
defensive strategies, both active 
aposematic warning systems and 
passive camouflage systems, which 
considerably enhance the chance of 
surviving a predatory encounter.
Where can I find out more?
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Recognition memory enables us to 
discriminate whether an event has 
occurred in the past, and is widely 
interpreted to reflect the conscious 
retrieval of episodic traces or familiarity 
[1,2]. Non-conscious mnemonic 
influences, such as repetition priming, 
are thought to have a negligible effect 
on standard tests of recognition 
memory [3]. A major difficulty with 
this conclusion is that it is exclusively 
based on the results from experimental 
protocols that use stimulus materials 
available to conscious perception. 
In eight experiments (N = 144), we 
tested the necessity of mechanisms 
related to conscious perception for 
accurate recognition memory by 
manipulating observers’ awareness 
of either the encoded event and/
or the retrieval cues. Remarkably, 
observers made accurate objective 
and subjective recognition memory-
guided judgments without visual 
awareness of the encoded events, 
retrieval cues or, most strikingly, 
both. These results demonstrate 
that non-conscious processes can 
drive accurate recognition memory, 
and are a significant challenge to 
neurobiological accounts centered 
on the conscious retrieval of episodic 
traces or familiarity.
In Experiment 1, we tested the 
prediction that non-conscious 
retrieval cues support recognition 
memory for visible words presented 
at study (Figure 1A). In the study 
phase, observers performed trial-
wise animacy judgments on 40 
visible words. After a five-minute 
interval, word-based retrieval cues 
(11.8 ms) were presented during a 
discrete test phase. These retrieval 
cues were rendered non-conscious 
by backward and forward masks 
(58.8 ms), and observers were asked 
to: (1) decide whether the masked 
retrieval cue was old or new; (2) rate 
the confidence associated with each 
old-new discrimination on a six-point 
scale; and (3) report the identity of 
Correspondences the masked cue. A signal detection theory-based objective measure 
(d′ = 0.30, t(17) = 2.74, p < 0.01; 
Figure 1B) and subjective confidence 
ratings (t(17) = 2.87, p < 0.01; 
Figure 1C) revealed accurate 
discrimination between masked old 
and new retrieval cues. Importantly, 
this occurred despite the inability of 
observers to report the identity of the 
retrieval cues (accuracy = 2%). 
In Experiment 2, we asked the 
reciprocal question: can words masked 
from visual awareness at study support 
accurate recognition with visible 
retrieval cues? To assess whether 
the words were adequately masked, 
observers rated the confidence of 
animacy judgements on a three-
point scale. The results revealed that, 
even though masking led to chance 
performance on animacy judgments 
at study (50.7%, t(17) = 0.4, n.s.), 
significant recognition memory was 
evident on the objective (d′ = 0.27, 
t(17 )= 3.32, p < 0.005) and subjective 
(t(17) = 3.24, p < 0.005) measures. 
Evidence from Experiments 1 and 2 is 
consistent with a view that conscious 
and non-conscious based mnemonic 
mechanisms can interact in service of 
accurate recognition memory.
In six additional experiments, words 
were masked from visual awareness 
at both study and test to identify 
whether non-conscious memory 
alone can drive accurate recognition 
memory. In Experiment 3a, single 
presentations of masked words led 
to chance recognition performance 
(d′ = 0.06, t(17) = 0.95, n.s.; subjective 
ratings, t(17) = 1.51, n.s.). Therefore, we 
modified the study protocol based on 
prior evidence that spaced repetition 
increases the likelihood that an 
event will be perceived as previously 
encountered [4]. In Experiment 3b, 
each masked word was now presented 
twice at study, with all other aspects of 
the design unchanged from Experiment 
3a. Critically, this manipulation led 
to accurate objective non-conscious 
discrimination (d′ = 0.15, t(17) = 2.03, 
p < 0.05), but did not support accurate 
subjective judgments (t(17) = 1.39, n.s.).
To establish if repetition could lead 
to accurate subjective judgments, 
masked words were next presented 
three times at study (Experiment 3c). 
Significant non-conscious recognition 
memory was evident again on the 
objective measure of discriminability 
(d′ = 0.22, t(17) = 2.40, p < 0.05), and this 
was now accompanied by accurate 
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Experimental protocol
Figure 1. Experimental protocol and results of Experiments 1 to 4b. 
(A) Word stimuli were either visible (presented for 2000 ms) or masked (presented for 11.8 ms 
and backward- and forward-masked for 58.8 ms). Each experiment involved a study and test 
phase, with masked words used in at least one of these phases. At study, observers provided 
an  animacy judgement in response to each word. After a five-minute interval, observers were 
presented with word-based retrieval cues, and provided an old/new judgement to each word, 
and then rated the confidence associated with their response. (B) Sensitivity to the difference 
between old and new word-based retrieval cues was calculated using d′ scores (chance = 0). 
(C) Subjective ratings were based on observers’ confidence associated with each old-new 
response (from 1, ‘certain old’, to 6, ‘certain new’). **p < 0.005; *p < 0.05; n.s. not significant.recognition memory in the subjective 
ratings (t(17) = 2.57, p < 0.01). We 
replicated these results in a further 
experiment (3d) that employed an 
additional assay of masking adequacy 
at retrieval. Specifically, trial-wise 
animacy judgements were performed 
after each subjective rating, and 
observers were excluded if animacy 
judgements between study and test 
improved (>5%). Despite this additional 
stringent criterion, significant 
recognition memory was evident on 
the objective (d′ = 0.14, t(17) = 2.47,  
p < 0.05) and subjective measures 
(t(17) = 2.81, p < 0.01). 
Finally, we examined whether 
stimulus-specific processing provided 
a source of fluency that could be 
used to infer prior occurrence [3,5]. 
In the first follow-up experiment, we mirror-reversed the masks between 
study and test (Experiment 4a), and 
in a second experiment, we changed 
the word case between study and 
test from lower-case to upper-case 
(Experiment 4b). The results replicated 
the non-conscious recognition effect 
observed in Experiments 3b–d, and 
also demonstrated that the effect was 
not dependent on stimulus-specific 
fluency, suggesting a possible role 
for lexical information (Experiment 
4a: d′ = 0.12, t(17) = 2.81, p < 0.01; 
subjective ratings, t(17) = 2.83, p < 0.01; 
Experiment 4b: d′ = 0.18, t(17) = 3.22,  
p < 0.005; subjective ratings, 
t(17) = 3.51, p < 0.005). 
Conscious memory is unlikely to 
explain the non-conscious recognition 
memory effects in Experiments 3–4. 
This view is supported by three independent sources of evidence. 
First, semantic encoding is strongly 
associated with conscious memory, 
but could not be easily deployed 
due to visual masking — animacy 
judgments at study (range 50.6–52.4%, 
all t(17) < 1.67, n.s.) and test (Experiment 
3d, 50.1 ± 1.1%, t(17) = 0.12, n.s.) were 
at chance. Furthermore, encoding 
accuracy was not correlated with 
above-chance significant d′s in 
Experiments 2–4b (each p > 0.18). 
Second, the results are based on the 
removal of studied words associated 
with accurate animacy judgments and 
a high confidence rating. Third, there 
was no difference in the reportability 
of 20 masked words before and after 
each experiment, which excludes 
a perceptual learning-mediated 
change in the identification threshold 
(mean difference –0.2–0.6%; all 
t(17) < 1.45, n.s.). 
In summary, we found evidence 
of a robust and unprecedented 
non-conscious recognition memory 
effect by modifying a conventional 
recognition memory task protocol. 
Observers made accurate objective 
and subjective recognition memory-
guided judgments, without conscious 
access to the words at study and test 
(Experiments 3–4). These experiments 
contrast with other paradigms, such 
as those based on the mere exposure 
effect, in which incidental encoding 
modulates affective judgements [6] 
(for a discussion, see Supplemental 
Information). The experimental evidence 
has three immediate implications. 
First, on the grounds that awareness 
is widely regarded as a prerequisite for 
establishing an episodic- or familiarity-
driven record or token of an event [7], 
the results provide an empirical basis 
on which to generate new hypotheses 
about the neural signals that can 
drive recognition memory [8–10]. 
Second, the protocol enables the 
effects of recognition-guided retrieval 
to be distinguished from downstream 
‘conscious mechanisms’, because 
masking excluded processes related 
to top-down attention; the intention 
to retrieve prior episodes; perceptual 
expectations; and the recovery of 
episodic information. Third, our protocol 
demonstrates that precluding visual 
awareness isolates non-conscious 
components of recognition memory, 
alongside other techniques based on 
encouraging guessing in response 
to highly similar retrieval cues [10]. 
Applying a protocol that is preferentially 
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A recent study of skeletal remains 
from Brazil belonging to the 
indigenous Botocudo peoples found 
that two male individuals presented 
a combination of mitochondrial DNA 
(mtDNA) variants common in present 
day Oceanian populations [1]. 
Although it was argued that these 
genetic traits were likely to be 
derived from runaway slaves brought 
to Brazil by Europeans, no direct-
dating or genomic analyses were 
used to support this conclusion. 
The Botocudos, named after the 
wooden disks (‘botoques’) in their 
lower lips and ear lobes, were an 
indigenous group with presumably 
Native American origins occupying 
the coast and the interior of 
Eastern-Central Brazil until the 
late 18th century, when most were 
exterminated by European colonists 
after decades of violence. The 
population size and origin of the 
Botocudos remain unclear, but 
they are likely to have comprised 
several tribes who spoke a common 
Macro-Jê language at the time of 
European contact [2]. We conducted 
a variety of genomic, morphological 
and isotopic analyses of skeletal 
remains attributed to the Botocudos 
of Brazil. 
We confined our analyses to four 
Botocudo individuals (Bot13, Bot15, 
Bot17 and Bot65; Supplemental 
information) after careful review of 
all available records at the Museu 
Nacional in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
including an extensive archival study 
that pointed to the four crania being 
bona fide Botocudo, a designation 
which is also corroborated by the 
labels on the skulls (Figure 1A). 
We performed an initial DNA 
screening by shotgun sequencing 
the four individuals, finding that 
only Bot15 and Bot17 yielded a 
endogenous human DNA content 
higher than 1% (5.6% and 12.5%, 
respectively), thus allowing 
for whole genome sequencing 
(Supplemental information). In total, 
we obtained genetic data from 
the following experiments: mtDNA 
capture for Bot15; single nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP) capture for 
6,000 ancestry informative markers 
(AIMs) for Bot15; and whole 
genome shotgun sequencing for 
Bot15 and Bot17 (to an average 
genomic depth of 1.2X and 1.5X, 
respectively). We found features in 
the data characteristic of ancient 
Two ancient 
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Understanding the peopling of the 
Americas remains an important 
and challenging question. Here, 
we present 14C dates, and 
morphological, isotopic and genomic 
sequence data from two human 
skulls from the state of Minas Gerais, 
Brazil, part of one of the indigenous 
groups known as ‘Botocudos’. We 
find that their genomic ancestry 
is Polynesian, with no detectable 
Native American component. 
Radiocarbon analysis of the skulls 
shows that the individuals had died 
prior to the beginning of the 19th 
century. Our findings could either 
represent genomic evidence of 
Polynesians reaching South America 
during their Pacific expansion, or 
European-mediated transport.sensitive to detecting mnemonic 
mechanisms operating outside of 
conscious perception can potentially 
clarify other controversies, such as the 
extent to which non-conscious memory 
mediates hippocampal-dependent 
tasks [9].
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes experi-
mental procedures, results and two tables, 
and can be found with this article online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.035.
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